Don’t Take My Word for It!

A Plagiarism Manual

UWF Writing Lab

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plagiarism, n. – 1). the action or practice of taking someone else’s work, idea, etc., and passing it off as one’s own; literary theft 2). a particular idea, piece of writing, design, etc., which has been plagiarized; an act or product of plagiarism

— Oxford English Dictionary
Cover illustration: Exam (2014)
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APPENDIX A: MLA Sample Paper ............... Error! Bookmark not defined.
APPENDIX B: APA Sample Paper Error! Bookmark not defined.
Some plagiarism is intentional. Students who are under time constraints or who are under pressure to deliver an exemplary paper or project may choose to copy and paste information without acknowledging their sources. Most of the time, however, students are not aware of the rules related to plagiarism, a situation which results in unintentional plagiarism (Academic Integrity, n.d.).

Additionally, students can self-plagiarize if they use their own previous work without providing proper attribution. Students might write about topics they have already addressed in papers for different courses, but if they wish to use information from their previous papers, they must cite themselves as they would any other author. Self-plagiarism also includes the use of an entire paper written for one course to fulfil an assignment for another course. Unless the student gets prior approval from the professors for both courses, recycling papers is considered plagiarism (Academic Integrity, n.d.).

Students may also plagiarize if they do not understand citation technique. Students must remember that even if they include a Reference or Work Cited entry at the end of a paper, they still have to use quotation marks to indicate material that is directly quoted. Paraphrased material should also include both an in-text or parenthetical citation and a References or Works Cited entry (Academic Integrity, n.d.).

(Anderson, n.d.)
Consequences of Plagiarism

Plagiarism is a serious offense. Universities, including the University of West Florida, reserve the right to expel students for plagiarism. If the plagiarism doesn’t warrant expulsion, the university may choose instead to fail a student in a given course. If the plagiarism wasn’t intentional, a professor may decide to fail a student for a particular assignment. In any case, professors and university administrators always take plagiarism seriously. Students who have been referred to the Writing Lab to receive help with plagiarism should also take the process seriously to avoid consequences (University of West Florida, 2014).
Resources

Plagiarism Tutorials and Tests

Almost every college and university has its own plagiarism tutorial, usually followed by a quiz. Many professors require their students to take this type of quiz to acquaint the students with plagiarism and to make students aware that they are responsible for their academic integrity. Listed below are some helpful tutorials that you may complete or refer to when you are having problems understanding what plagiarism is.

**Acadia University**

[http://library.acadiau.ca/tutorials/plagiarism/](http://library.acadiau.ca/tutorials/plagiarism/)

This interactive tutorial allows you to participate in a plagiarism scenario by taking characters through the lesson. The tutorial doesn’t take very long to complete, but it offers some important information. For example, the tutorial provides good information about common knowledge and the differences between direct quotation and paraphrasing. This resource works especially well if you are a visual learner.

**Butler University**

[http://blue.butler.edu/bb/plagiarism/Plagiarism%20Project%202010_20_10.html](http://blue.butler.edu/bb/plagiarism/Plagiarism%20Project%202010_20_10.html)

This tutorial is a good introduction to plagiarism because it’s in video format and because it offers information about why academic credibility is important. If you are resistant to the idea of going through webpage after webpage of information, you may find this resource refreshing. Keep in mind that the text disappears quickly; therefore, it’s a good idea to pause the video when a screen of text appears. Additionally, you cannot complete a quiz at the end (only students who attend Butler may do so), so it may be difficult to gauge comprehension. Nonetheless, this video is a good starter for recognizing plagiarism.
The University of Southern Mississippi

http://www.lib.usm.edu/legacy/plag/plagiarismtutorial.php

This tutorial is helpful because it provides a quiz to pre-test your knowledge of plagiarism. You may find this resource useful if you previously thought you understood plagiarism but you have been flagged by your professor for having plagiarized. Plagiarism is a multifaceted issue, but this website will help you begin to identify the many components that comprise plagiarism. After completing the site’s tutorial, you can take a post-test to ensure that you understand what constitutes plagiarism.

Other Online Tutorials

A quick Google search will list numerous plagiarism tutorials and quizzes. Feel free to complete the tutorials that work best for you. UWF has its own tutorial, but chances are, you’ve completed it at least once. If you have taken UWF’s tutorial and are still having problems, you may appreciate a different approach.

(Brookins and MacNelly, 2015)

Plagiarism Exercises

Once you understand what plagiarism is, you should take care not to make simple mistakes that could result in an accusation of academic misconduct. The following sites represent just a few of the many websites where you can test your knowledge.
In order to complete the exercises at this site, you must identify yourself as either a Cornell student or a guest. Once you click the guest option, you will be directed to the practice questions, which are presented as case studies in which you must determine whether the author of the passage has used sources correctly. This site also provides explanations for why answers are correct or incorrect.
This site offers ten practice questions that ask you to choose which of two options is not plagiarized. Each question provides the source citation, the original source material, and two answer options. After you select your answers, the site provides an explanation for why each answer is right or wrong.
NIU’s plagiarism practice comes in the form of two different games that you can play to help you better understand real-world instances of plagiarism. The games offer instructions for play. While the games are good resources, they do contain a couple of grammatical errors, one being “Sorry you loose” if you answer too many questions incorrectly. Though the site isn’t exemplary of correct grammar, its plagiarism exercises are valuable learning tools.
Avoiding Plagiarism

Addressing Problem Areas

To start, you might want to navigate the tutorials shown above to go over specific plagiarism topics. Each tutorial is useful as an overall plagiarism tool, but you may find that one works better than another for addressing, say, in-text citations. For this reason, it’s best to visit each site briefly (or another source that isn’t listed) to decide which one will help you. On the other hand, if you have a specific problem, say parenthetical citation, you might want to go over the rules in the pertinent sections of this manual.

Whatever method you choose, go over the information several times. When you think you understand, go over the topic once more just to be certain. You might even assign yourself “homework.” For instance, you might pull up an article online and write a paragraph that uses information from the article and correctly employs in-text citations.

(Pasaje, 2012)
Ethical Use of Source Materials

There are three ways to use ideas from source materials ethically:

1. **Summary:** reducing large blocks of another person’s text to a short passage in one’s own words. Summary can be used to simplify complex ideas, pull important points out of a more detailed document, or simply shorten a long passage. Regardless of the reason for summarizing a text, proper citation is imperative. Just because one puts an idea into his or her own words, that does not make it his or her idea. The idea still belongs to the original author, and credit must be given to that writer. Failure to attribute an idea summarized from another person’s work is theft of intellectual property (Avoiding Plagiarism, n.d.).

2. **Paraphrasing:** changing another writer’s words without changing the meaning. Paraphrasing can be used to simplify flowery or overly technical language or to clarify passages that lack context. Again, the idea remains the intellectual property of the original author, so it must be properly cited (Avoiding Plagiarism, n.d.).

3. **Quotation:** an exact copy of the original language used in the source text. Direct quotation is appropriate when the original language cannot be improved upon or when it is the language, not just the idea, that matters. In addition to the citation, a direct quote requires quotation marks around the copied material. (Avoiding Plagiarism, n.d.)

Integrating Quoted Material

The first step in properly using source material is integrating quotes. Listed below are three easy ways to integrate quoted material into a text. Each method allows for smooth integration of quoted material in a particular situation. Keep in mind that the rules of grammar apply even when quoted material is part of the sentence. To integrate a quote effectively, one must identify the role the quote is playing in the structure of the sentence (Phelps, 2016).
**Method 1: partial quote**

Use this method when the quoted material is not in the form of a complete sentence. The student’s own writing will fill in the missing words to form a complete sentence (Phelps, 2016).

- **Subject verb “partial quote.”**
  Oscar Wilde complained that he was “finding it harder and harder to live up to [his] blue china” (as cited in King, n.d., n.p.).
- **“Partial quote” verb object.**
  “All the king’s horses and all the king’s men” fail to save poor Humpty Dumpty’s life (Denslow, 1901, p. 14).
- **Subject “partial quote” object or completing thought.**
  Lily Tomlin (1977) “should have been more specific” about who she wanted to be.

**Method 2: complete quote with introductory elements**

Use this method when the quote is composed of a complete sentence preceded by with an introductory verb. Notice that, like any other complete sentence, the quote begins with a capital letter (Phelps, 2016).

- **Subject verb, “Complete sentence.”**
  John Lennon (1971) acknowledges, “You may say I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one.”

**Method 3: complete quote with explication**

Use this method when the quote is a complete sentence preceded by another complete sentence that both introduces and explains the quoted material. Again, since the quoted material is a complete sentence, it must begin with a capital letter (Phelps, 2016).

- **Complete sentence: “Complete sentence.”**
  The Munchkins give Dorothy only one instruction: “Follow the yellow brick road” (LeRoy, 1939).
Introductory Verbs

When integrating quoted material from another source, avoid empty introductory verbs such as says, writes, thinks, or feels. Instead, choose introductory verbs carefully to reflect your true intentions for the data you are introducing – in other words, say what you mean, and mean what you say.

Verbs for Introducing Summaries and Quotations

The following list contains active verbs that can be used to introduce data (quotation or summary). These verbs are categorized according to the quoted material’s purpose in your paper. Note that some verbs in each category are more emphatic than others. If in doubt about the meaning of a word, look it up before using it (Graff & Birkenstein, 2009).

- Verbs to Show the Author Is Making a Claim
  - argues
  - asserts
  - believes
  - claims
  - emphasizes
  - insists
  - observes
  - reminds us
  - reports
  - suggests

(Baldwin, 2005.)
• Verbs to Show the Author Agrees with Something Someone Else Has Proposed
acknowledges  endorses
admires  extols
agrees  praises
celebrates the fact that  reaffirms
corroborates  supports
does not deny  verifies

• Verbs to Show the Author Questions or Disagrees with Something Someone Else Has Proposed
complains  disavows
complicates  questions
contends  refutes
contradicts  rejects
denies  renounces
deplores the tendency to  repudiates

• Verbs to Show the Author Is Making a Recommendation
advocates  implores
calls for  pleads
demands  recommends
courages  urges
exhorts  warns

Disciplinary Introductory Verbs
Another way of thinking about introductory verbs is to categorize them by the author’s field of study. Below is a list of introductory verbs for quotes and summaries sorted by frequency of use in a variety of disciplines. Note that usage progresses from generally subjective in the humanities to almost entirely objective in the physical sciences. This difference does not necessarily reflect the quality of data; it is more a function of the writers’ perceptions of data relevant to their own fields and the traditional methods of knowledge production they employ. Authors in the humanities tend to invite debate, while authors in the so-called “hard sciences” are more
interested in presenting empirical evidence to support a hypothesis (Hyland, 2004). Matching disciplinary norms to the quotations you use helps to clarify your intentions for using that particular source material (Hyland).

- **Humanities**
  - Philosophy: say, suggest, argue, claim, point out, propose, think
  - Sociology: argue, suggest, describe, note, analyze, discuss
- **Non-Physical (Soft) Sciences**
  - Applied Linguistics: suggest, argue, show, explain, find, point out
  - Marketing: suggest, argue, demonstrate, propose, show
  - Biology: describe, find, report, show, suggest, observe
- **Physical (Hard) Sciences**
  - Electronic Engineering: propose, use, describe, show, publish
  - Mechanical Engineering: describe, show, report, discuss
  - Physics: develop, report, study

**Quotation and Citation Style: MLA**

The following is adapted from the *MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, 8th edition*, 2016.

Use quotations selectively. Quote only words, phrases, lines, and passages that are particularly interesting, vivid, unusual, or apt, and keep all quotations as brief as possible. The accuracy of quotations in research writing is extremely important. They must reproduce the original sources exactly. Unless indicated in brackets or parentheses, changes must not be made in the spelling, capitalization, or interior punctuation of the source. You must construct a clear, grammatically correct sentence that allows you to introduce or incorporate a quotation with complete accuracy. You may paraphrase the original, and you may choose to quote only fragments.

When quoting an author for the first time in your text, be sure to give the author’s first and last names as well as the full title of the work to which you are referring. From that initial point on, the author may be referred to by his or her last name only. If you refer to the author in the sentence, you need to add only a page number at the end of the quotation, but if you do not mention the author in text, then you must include the author’s last name and page number in the parenthetical reference.
Examples for common in-text citations are listed below.

**A parenthetical citation when the author’s name is shown in text:**

According to Naomi Baron, reading is “just half of literacy. The other half is writing” (194). One might even suggest that reading is never complete without writing.

**A parenthetical citation when the author’s name does not appear in text:**

Reading is “just half of literacy. The other half is writing” (Baron 194). One might even suggest that reading is never complete without writing.

**A quotation consisting of forty or more words (Note that the period comes before the parenthetical citation in this circumstance):**

The forms of writing that accompany reading can fill various roles. The simplest is to make parts of a text prominent (by underlining, highlighting, or adding asterisks, lines, or squiggles) More-reflective responses are notes written in the margins or in an external location—a notebook or a computer file. (Baron 194.)

All these forms of writing bear in common the reader’s desire to add to, complete, or even alter the text.

**A parenthetical citation when the author shares the same last name as the author of another source:**

Reading is “just half of literacy. The other half is writing” (N. Baron 194). One might even suggest that reading is never complete without writing.

**A parenthetical citation when the author has contributed more than one work:**

Reading is just “half of literacy. The other half is writing” (Baron, “Redefining” 194). One might even suggest that reading is never complete without writing.
A parenthetical citation when information is combined from more than one source:

While reading may be the core of literacy, literacy can be complete only when reading is accompanied by writing (Baron 194; Jacobs 55).

A parenthetical citation from a source with an anonymous author (Use a shortened version of the title of the work):

Reading at Risk: A Survey of Literary reading in America notes that despite an apparent decline in reading during the same period, “the number of people doing creative writing—of any genre, not exclusively literary works—increased substantially between 1982 and 2002” (3).

Despite an apparent decline in reading the same period, “the number of people doing creative writing—of any genre, not exclusively literary works—increased substantially between 1982 and 2002” (Reading 3).

A parenthetical citation from a source with paragraph numbers instead of page numbers:

There is little evidence here for the claim that “Engleton has belittled the gains of postmodernism” (Chan, par. 41).

A parenthetical citation from a source with no page or paragraph numbers:

“As we read we . . . construct the terrain of a book” (Hollmichel), something that is more difficult when the text reflows on a screen.

A parenthetical citation from an audio or video source with a time or range of times:

Buffy’s promise that “there’s not going to be any incidents like at my old school” is obviously not one on which she can follow through (“Buffy” 00:03:16-17).

A parenthetical citation for an indirect source:

Samuel Johnson admitted that Edmund Burke was an “extraordinary man” (qtd. in Boswell 2: 450).
Works Cited: MLA

The eighth edition of the *MLA Handbook* remains largely unchanged from the seventh edition. However, some significant changes do exist, and academic writers should learn the new format. The primary change is seen in the way works-cited entries are formatted. The new MLA no longer requires writers to model their works-cited entries after specific examples from the handbook. Instead, core elements of any entry are listed in a specific order. If a source lacks a particular component, that element is simply omitted. Core elements of an MLA works cited entry are listed in the following order:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Title of Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Title of container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Other contributors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Publisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Publication date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each element should be punctuated as shown above. The following pages provide a quick reference for each element with illustrations of how the elements appear in various media.
One author:


Two authors:


Three or more authors:


One editor when referring to an anthology or edited volume in its entirety:


Two or more editors when referring to an anthology or edited volume in its entirety:


One or more translators when the focus of the reference is on the translation rather than the content:


One author in a translated volume when the focus of the reference is on the content rather than the translation:


A contributor to a film or television program when the focus of the reference is on the contribution of that particular person rather than the film’s content:


A film or television program when the focus of the reference is on the content rather than individuals who contributed to its production:

Pseudonyms and online user names:
@persiankiwi, “We have report of large street battles in east & west of Tehran now - #Iranelection.” Twitter, 23 June 2009, 11:15 a.m., twitter.com/persiankiwi/status/2298106072.

A work published without an author’s name:

A corporate author (an institution, an association, a government agency, etc.):

A book title:

A book title with a subtitle:
Title of source. (continued)

The title of an entire anthology or collection by various authors:


The title of an essay, a story, or a poem in a collection:


The title of an entire periodical (journal, magazine, newspaper):


The title of an article in a periodical:


The title of a television series:

The title of an episode in a television series:


The title of a Web site:


The title of a posting or an article from a Web site:


The title of a music album:


The title of a song or other piece of music on an album:


A source with no title, description of source:

Mackintosh, Charles Rennie. Chair of stained oak. 1897-1900, Victoria and Albert Museum, London.
A source with no title, description of source that refers to another source:


A short untitled message such as a tweet (Reproduce full text of message):

@persiankiwi. “We have report of large street battles in east & west of Tehran now - #Iranelection.” Twitter, 23 June 2009, 11:15 a.m., twitter.com/persiankiwi/status/2298106072.

An email message (Use subject line as title):

An anthology, a collection of essays, stories, poems, images, or other kinds of works:


A periodical (journal, magazine, newspaper):


A television series:


A Web site:


A container within a container:


A translator:


An editor:


A contributor to a film, television episode, or performance:


A translator or other contributor who plays a role in only one part of a collection or anthology (Place the contributor immediately after the portion to which he or she contributed):

A version:


An edition:


Versions in digital media:


A volume in a multi-volume set:

A volume and issue in a journal:


A season and episode of a television series:


The publisher of a book:


The entity with primary responsibility for a film or television program:

A Web site (Look for publisher’s information in the copyright notice at the bottom of the home page):

Harris, Charles “Teenie.” *Woman in Paisley Shirt behind Counter in Record Store. Teenie Harris Archive*, Carnegie Museum of Art, Pittsburgh, teenie.cmoa.org/interactive/inex.html#date08.

A blog network:


A publication for which no publisher’s information is necessary:

- A periodical (journal, magazine, or newspaper
- A work published by its author or editor
- A Web site whose title is essentially the same as the name of its publisher
- A Web site not involved in producing the works it makes available (e.g., a service for users’ content like WordPress.com or YouTube, an archive like JSTOR or ProQuest).
The publication date for an online source (Do not use the print date):


The publication date for a print source:


The publication year for an episode of a television series:


The posting date for a video on a Web site:


The date of publication for an article on the Web:

The posting date for comments on Web pages:


The range of publication dates for a Web project as a whole:


The publication date for an issue of a periodical:


The year of publication for a book:

A page number in a print source:


A range of page numbers in a print source:


A URL:


A DOI (Digital Object Identifier):


A disc number for a DVD in a set:

A place where an object of art is displayed or an artifact is archived:


A number or other code:


A performance, lecture, or presentation venue:


The city of publication for a book published before 1900:


The city of publication when different versions of a text are released for different locations (e.g. a British version with different spelling or vocabulary from the American version):

The number of volumes in a multi-volume source:


A book in a series:


A transcript:


A lecture or other address:


Information about prior publication:

United States Congress:


Date of access for an online source (Use when the source or its container is subject to frequent change):


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**Quotation and Citation Style: APA**

The following is an excerpt from the UWF Writing Lab’s APA Style Reference Guide (2010a). The text has been adapted from the *Publication manual of the American Psychological Association* (6th ed.).

When using ideas or words from a source, whether quoted or paraphrased, you must give credit to the author or authors of the source. Credit may be given one of two ways: a) through a parenthetical citation following the quoted or paraphrased material or b) by directly mentioning the author and year in the text in conjunction with the quoted or paraphrased material. For a parenthetical citation, list the following at the end of the sentence: author’s name, year of publication, and page number, separated by commas. A period follows the citation:

The results of this study proved that students with low writing self-efficacy were hesitant to write, even if their discursive skills rated above average: “If self-efficacy is lacking, people tend to behave ineffectually, even though they know what to do” (Bandura, 1986, p. 425).
For an in-text citation, the year of publication is always mentioned in conjunction with the author’s name as follows. The year follows the author, but the page number follows the quotation:

Bandura (1986) demonstrated, “If self-efficacy is lacking, people tend to behave ineffectually, even though they know what to do” (p. 425).

Include the page number only when citing a direct quote. If a quote has been taken from more than one page of text, write “pp.” instead of “p.” in the citation: (Schultz, 2009, pp. 149-150).

For electronic sources, follow the in-text parenthetical citation style for print sources. However, for non-paginated material, use the paragraph number instead of the page number with a direct quote: (Wilmoth, 2010, para. 9). If the non-paginated document is especially lengthy, cite the paragraph number in the heading or chapter: (Wilmoth, 2010, Discussion, para. 1).

The different formats for both in-text and parenthetical citations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First citation in text</th>
<th>Subsequent citations in text</th>
<th>Parenthetical format, first citation in text</th>
<th>Parenthetical format, subsequent citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One author</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two authors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three to five authors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six or more authors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasserstein et al. (2005)</td>
<td>Wasserstein et al.</td>
<td>(Wasserstein et al., 2005)</td>
<td>(Wasserstein et al., 2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Secondary Sources

To cite a source within a source, use “as cited in.” Do not include a citation for the cited source in the reference list; only include the source in which it was found:

According to McLeod (1987), the writing process is as much an emotional as a cognitive activity (as cited in Pajares et al., 2007).

The writing process is as much an emotional as a cognitive activity (McLeod, 1987, as cited in Pajares et al., 2007).

• Personal Communications

Personal communications are letters, e-mail, personal interviews, telephone conversations, and other non-archived material. Because personal communications cannot be retrieved, they are not cited in the reference list. In text, list the initials, the surname of the communicator, and the date:

T. K. Lutes (personal communication, April 18, 2001).

(T. K. Lutes, personal communication, April 18, 2001).

• Block quotes

If a quotation exceeds 40 words, put it in an indented block of text and omit the quotation marks:

Entire quote is indented a half-inch from the text.

The beliefs students hold about their writing capabilities powerfully influence their writing performances, as well as the academic choices they make in high school and college (Hackett, 1995). Less is known, however, about how these self-beliefs take hold and are developed.

(Pajares et al., 2007, p. 117)

For block quotes, the period goes before, not after, the parenthetical citation.

If the quotation references multiple paragraphs, indent the first line of each paragraph an additional half-inch.
References: APA

The bibliographical entry for an annotated bibliography is exactly the same as a reference entry on the References page of a paper. For the title of an article, capitalize only the first word of the title, the word following a colon, and any proper nouns. Do not italicize the article’s title or put it in quotes. For the title of a book or report, capitalize only the first word of the title, the word following a colon, and any proper nouns; then italicize. For the title of a periodical (a journal, newspaper, or magazine), capitalize all words but articles and short prepositions; then italicize both the title and the volume number that follows. Do not italicize punctuation that is not part of a title. If the source has no date, use (n.d.) both in the reference list and in the parenthetical citation (UWF Writing Lab, 2010a).

For a Source with Multiple Authors

Include up to seven authors in a citation. With eight or more authors, include the first six authors, then insert three ellipses, and add the last author’s name.


For a Periodical

- A journal article


- An electronic journal article with a DOI

Include the digital object identifier (DOI) if one is assigned. If no DOI is assigned to the content and the article was retrieved online, include the home page URL for the journal, newsletter, or magazine in the reference. No retrieval date is needed. Do not put a period at the end of a URL.

- **An electronic journal article with a URL**


- **A newspaper article**


  Precede page numbers for newspaper articles with *p.* for a single page or *pp.* for multiple pages.

- **An electronic newspaper article**


**For a Book**


The publishing location should contain at least two geographic elements, as in city, country or city, state. Ampersands are acceptable in publisher names.

- **An article or chapter in an edited book**

An electronic version of a print book


The name of the electronic version in brackets follows the name of the book.

For a more detailed listing of references, see the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA). Additional information about APA can be found at http://apastyle.apa.org/

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“Yes, I did the book report myself. I found it on eBay myself, I bid on it myself, I paid for it myself, I printed it myself...”

(Glasbergen, n.d.)
Assessment

Once you feel your student has a good grasp of plagiarism, in general and in the areas in which he or she needed the most instruction, utilize one of the sites suggested on pp. 6-8 of this manual to test your student’s knowledge. You can also create your own test or practice exercise. At this point, your student should be well-acquainted with the information and shouldn’t have many problems answering questions correctly. If he or she does have trouble, you may need to revisit some tutorials to refresh his or her memory. Again, you have complete control of this process, so if you feel that a student isn’t mastering a topic as he or she should, assign additional tutorials or research.

Plagiarism is a pitfall for many students, but with your help, a student who has previously had problems with academic integrity can go forward knowing what plagiarism is and how to avoid it.

(Watterson, 1986)
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APPENDIX A
MLA Attribution Samples
Female Subjectivity and the Social Order: A Defense of Kant’s Categorical Imperative

It is a common move among second-wave feminist writers to advocate for a separate and distinct female subjectivity. Such ideologies seek to establish a new way of looking at the subject and, perhaps more importantly, at the Other – a way that ostensibly does not objectify the Other, but instead attempts to intuit some sort of understanding of the Other, to see the Other on his or her own terms rather than as a problem to be dealt with in the “proper” manner. In seeking out this new subjectivity, it has often been deemed necessary to call out the universal subject position of Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative, explicitly labeling it as totalitarian in its failure to adequately acknowledge the particularity of the Other and of the material and psychical conditions of the Other’s existence. While this vein of criticism has its merits, however, feminist writers often go too far in their wholesale rejection of the Categorical Imperative. A look at the broader, real-world implications of feminist proposals for secondary subject positions shows that the Categorical Imperative provides a foundation for ethics and countermands relativism in a way that particularity alone cannot.

Though the connection is not immediately evident, the socio-political efficacy or inefficacy of the Kantian Categorical Imperative in relation to the Other is in fact a feminist issue. The link lies, at least in part, in the characterization by second wave feminist philosophers such as Luce Irigaray of “masculine” ethics as being associated with the...
universalizing effect of the Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative, they insist, is not objective as Kant hoped, but bound up in the culturally constructed ideologies of the white, Western, heterosexual, Christian male. According to Irigaray, the Other has historically been defined in relation to the universal – that is Kantian – subject: “one, singular, solitary and historically masculine, that of the adult Western male, rational, competent” (83). The Other, by Irigaray’s definition, is defined in the negative and cannot include the feminine, the non-Western, children, the irrational or non-rational, or the incompetent or incapacitated. Understandably, Irigaray wants to establish a second subject, separate but equal to the Kantian subject, to counteract the relegation of difference to the negative in relation to Kant’s universal subject. She rejects the expansion of the Kantian subject to include the Other on the grounds that “the exploitation and the alienation of women are located in the differences between the sexes and the genders, and have to be resolved in that difference, without trying to abolish it, which would amount to yet another reduction to the singular subject” (Irigaray 85). Difference must be recognized and respected even in a state of equality, and to acknowledge the qualities that are the same in both the adult male and the Other but, in doing so, to erase difference. But Irigaray’s development of the two begs the question: why should the two be demarcated along gender lines and not along some other line of difference? In thus delineating subjects, she appears to want to provide a paradigm that recognizes some set of differences while ensuring that everyone is covered by one conception of subjectivity or the other, but Irigaray’s claim that “these two subjects have the duty of preserving the human species” (86) seems blatantly heteronormative and has an essentializing effect on both gendered subjects, even as it leaves the congenitally intersexed,
the differently gendered, and the transsexual outside of bigendered subjectivity. Thus, even at its best, Irigaray’s conception of the *two* is inadequate to cover everyone.

Moreover, though she insists that a paradigm of two subjects rather than one universal subject can lead to greater intersubjectivity, presumably through the superior powers of empathy inherent in the female, thereby furthering her case for a gendered demarcation of dual subjects, Irigaray’s stipulation that the two subjects “should not be situated in either a hierarchical or genealogic relationship” (86) can be read to excuse hierarchical classifications along the lines of race, thus potentially furthering the othering of non-whites by both masculine and feminine classes of subjects. In fact, in relation to the Other, whether the Other is in the opposing subject position or in the position of any Other not defined by gender, there is little to suggest that Irigaray’s female generic of the Kantian subject amounts to much more than the Kantian subject in a dress. By essentializing the feminine, Irigaray creates a limited universal that is potentially as exclusionary as the single Kantian subject.

Finally, a second subject position necessitates a second set of universal features that define the subject as such. Irigaray declares that “it *is* essential to ensure that this barely defined feminine subject, lacking contours and edges, with neither norms nor mediations, have some points of reference, some guarantees, in order to nourish her and protect her own becoming” (87). In seeking to define the terms and limits of the feminine subject, Irigaray actually begins to erase difference within the very set of former Others whom she has gathered into her circle of female subjectivity. Originally broad and diverse, Irigaray’s second subject must *become* Woman according to a set of characteristics that it is “necessary to *give* woman”
and which Irigaray considers “appropriate to them” (emphasis added) (87). But if the feminine subject does not come ready-made, if she does not exist outside an artificially constructed circle of feminine subjectivity, what is the point of inventing Woman purely for the sake of having a subjectivity into which to hale a set of Others nominally defined as female? Irigaray outlines a set of feminine characteristics involving “relationships with language, with the body (age, health, beauty, and, obviously, maternity), and relationships with work, nature and culture” (87). But these relationships are by no means the same for all women, and for many women, they may be no different than for men. Are these women, then, not women? If they do not assume these prescribed relationships, they are then relegated to the place of Other, shut out of the second subject position that was ostensibly conceived to de-Other them . . .

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. . . In her critique of Immanuel Kant, Sylviane Agacinski posits a different reason for rejecting the Kantian universal, insisting that the universality of Kant’s Categorical Imperative makes the formula untenantly egoistic and imposes on the subject an abstract sense of duty toward the other at the expense of difference as it regards all others as self-same. Agacinski argues that Kantian ethics “excludes the relation to the other and the other’s voice” (41), reducing all ethical questions to the subject and his or her general, predetermined duty in a given situation rather than attending to the needs of the other, rendering the other a mere object for the use of the subject. Unlike Irigaray, Agacinski does recognize the possibility of women’s occupying the Kantian universal subject position. Agacinski’s complaint is not about who populates that subject position, but about the manner in which the subject goes about interacting with the Other. No doubt, her criticism would be entirely valid if Kant had not
extended his Categorical Imperative beyond its first formulation, but Agacinski addresses only the Principle of Universality in her critique: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant). She declines to discuss the Principle of Humanity (End in Itself): “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never at any time as a mere means to an end, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant). These two principles, along with the Principle of Rationality, amount to an attempt on Kant’s part to categorize the good into sweeping, fundamental maxims that would provide both the individual subject and the collective society with an ethical device that could be deployed in any conceivable circumstance. The proper use of this device, however, is contingent upon the subject’s ability to employ reason and, especially in the first formulation, on the subject’s position in society, which affects his perspective on what is desirable in the social order.

On its own, the first formulation certainly seems to result in the absolute egoism Agacinski says it does, in which “there is no need for me to listen to the other in order to discover how I should behave towards them, for my reason will tell me” (41). By the standard of the first formulation, it would appear that the subject’s only criterion for ethical decisions should be a rational cost-benefit analysis of the effect his actions would have on the material conditions of his own existence if they were to be put into practice by others. The desires of others and impact of one’s actions on others do not come into question. Moreover, the first formulation relies entirely on the Kantian conception of reason for its ethical foundation and thus tends toward the hypothetical and the general rather than the particular and the personal.
However, the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative is not supposed to stand alone. In his second formulation, Kant himself provides a buffer against the egoism that Agacinski decries. The second formulation does, contra Agacinski’s assertion, deny the subject the right to treat the other as a means to an end, maintaining that the other is to be viewed as an end in itself, thereby moving the subject toward the kind of particularity Agacinski argues for, if only for the sake of universality in praxis as well as theory. Kant’s exhortation to treat others as ends unto themselves effectively forces the subject to recognize and respect the other’s needs and desires as equal to his own by causing the subject to question what it is the other desires and why.

Admittedly, a flaw in the second formulation is that the subject must first recognize the subjectivity of the other, thus potentially disregarding the subjectivity of women and minorities (or women’s recognition of the subjectivity of men, for that matter). Certainly, Kant himself did not understand women as being included in the subject position (Agacinski). However, the problems proposed by this shortcoming are no worse than any other differences that the problems that arise out of feminist conceptions of multiple subjectivities. No effective way has been proposed to enforce the wholesale acceptance of the subjectivity of all persons, the recognition of a separate subjectivity in persons of other classes of subjects is equally unenforceable. The recognition of Irigaray’s distinct feminine subject can no more be made compulsory than can the female as subject in Kant’s conception of universal subjectivity.

With any foundational rubric for ethical behavior, there will always be those who are not in compliance. The failure of some to fulfill their ethical obligations must not be seen to suggest that we should have no foundational set of ethics.
Kant argued that practical (experiential) reason is inferior to pure (*a priori*) reason predicated on a deontological code or *imperative* because practical reason’s empirical nature makes it necessarily contingent, circumstantial, subjective. His Categorical Imperative was designed to provide an objective foundation of ethics to counter the moral relativism of Utilitarian Ethics. As such, reason is intended to be deployed as a tool by individuals to preempt conflict within the greater social sphere. The Categorical Imperative is intended to be applied to the relations between individual subjects in the interest of maintaining the peace on a larger scale. The Categorical Imperative is designed and deliberately anticipatory, prescribing not so much the individual subject’s relation to the individual Other as the individual subject’s relation to society. According to Henri Bergson, the *Closed Religion* of the Categorical Imperative is static, rigid, and bound up with an impetus toward the codification of social cohesion and the survival of the community:

Society has its own mode of existence peculiar to it, and therefore its own mode of thinking. So far as we are concerned, we shall readily admit the existence of collective representations, deposited in institutions, language and customs. Together they constitute a social intelligence which is the complement of individual intelligences. (104)

The universalizing effect of the Categorical Imperative finds its purpose not in the ratification of individual rights, in the correction or punishment of particular injustices, or even in the inscription of subjectivity upon individual persons, but in the perpetuation of collective knowledge, perceptions, values, and norms. Thus, while arguments such as Agacinski’s that
critique the Categorical Imperative on its inability to underwrite particularity may be correct, they are asking the Categorical Imperative to do something that it was never designed to do.

Justice, by any definition, cannot be achieved without particularity. It is one thing to anticipate injustice, define the conditions of it, warn against it, and set out incentives for avoiding it; that is what the Categorical Imperative is meant to do. It is another thing to mete out justice in particular cases; the Categorical Imperative cannot see in retrospect or on the level of the individual to adjudicate actual cases on the ground. Indeed, one of Bergson’s major criticisms of the Categorical Imperative is that it forms an incomplete version of justice: a guarantor of communal harmony (assuming everyone is in compliance) unmediated by the collective valuation of the individual:

... this conjunction of individuals ... has given rise to a collective intelligence, certain representations of which will be puzzling to the individual mind. If sociology is open to criticism, it would ... be that ... certain of its exponents tend to regard the individual as an abstraction, and the social body as the only reality. (104-5)

Under such conditions, not only is the individual lost in the crowd, but subjectivity is also limited to those who are in possession of the collective intelligence. According to Bergson, when an individual decides to stray from his obligations to society, perhaps because there is more in it for him than he stands to gain from maintaining a stable connection to the community, the rule of law is in place in an attempt to codify habit and social need, anticipate resistance to individual social obligation, and countermand that resistance as it occurs. Collective justice consists of whatever is perceived by those interpolated into that system to be
in the best interest of the community. In this sense, justice is not justice at all, but merely law (Derrida). It stands to reason, then, that since crowds are less agile than individuals, the
evolution of the notion of justice in a given society – indeed, the evolution of communal
designations of subjectivity – is slow and laborious . . .

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. . . the very vagueness that serves to make Kant’s Categorical Imperative universal also gives
it the ability to be specifically ethical if and only if it is not codified into law, a situation which
precludes the Categorical Imperative’s being a wellspring of justice and relegates it to being a
tool for the application of mere law. Nonetheless, particularity should not be read to mean
lawlessness. Social order is, of course, crucial to the wellbeing of all members of a given
society, regardless of their status. Kant’s Categorical Imperative, deployed with the
compassion that particularity affords, remains an invaluable tool for the achievement of social
order.


APPENDIX B
APA Attribution Samples
Female Subjectivity and the Social Order: A Defense of Kant’s Categorical Imperative

It is a common move among second-wave feminist writers to advocate for a separate and distinct female subjectivity. Such ideologies seek to establish a new way of looking at the subject and, perhaps more importantly, at the Other – a way that ostensibly does not objectify the Other, but instead attempts to understand the Other on his or her own terms, to see the Other on his or her own terms rather than as a problem to be dealt with in the “proper” manner. In seeking out this new subjectivity, it has often been deemed necessary to call out the universal subject position of Immanuel Kant’s (1785) Categorical Imperative, explicitly labeling it as totalitarian in its failure to adequately acknowledge the particularity of the Other and of the material and psychical conditions of the Other’s existence. While this vein of criticism has its merits, however, feminist writers often go too far in their wholesale rejection of the Categorical Imperative. A look at the broader, real-world implications of feminist proposals for secondary subject positions shows that the Categorical Imperative provides a foundation for ethics and countermands relativism in a way that particularity alone cannot.

Though the connection is not immediately evident, the socio-political efficacy or inefficacy of the Kantian Categorical Imperative in relation to the Other is in fact a feminist issue. The link lies, at least in part, in the characterization by second wave feminist philosophers such as Irigaray (2004) of “masculine” ethics as being associated with the universalizing effect of the Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative, as Kant envisioned it, is not objective as Kant (1785) hoped, but bound up in the culturally constructed ideologies of the white, Western, heterosexual, Christian male. According to Irigaray (2004), the Other has historically been defined in relation to the universal – that is Kantian – subject: “one, singular, solitary and historically masculine, that of the adult Western male, rational, competent” (p. 83).
The Other, by Irigaray’s definition, is defined in the negative and can thus be read to include the feminine, the non-Western, children, the irrational or non-rational, and the incompetent or incapacitated. Irigaray wants to establish a second subject, separate but equal to the Kantian subject, to counteract the relegation of difference to the negative in relation to Kant’s universal subject. She rejects the expansion of the Kantian subject to include the Other on the grounds that “the exploitation and the alienation of women are located in the differences between the sexes and the genders, and have to be resolved in that difference, without trying to abolish it, which would amount to yet another reduction to the singular subject” (Irigaray, 2004, p. 85).

Difference must be recognized and respected even in a state of equality, and to enfold the Other into the Kantian subject would be to acknowledge the qualities that are the same in both the Western adult male and the Other but, in doing so, to erase difference. The development of the two begs the question: why should the two be demarcated along gender lines and not along some other line of difference? In thus delineating subjects, she appears to want to provide a paradigm that recognizes some set of differences while ensuring that everyone is covered by one conception of subjectivity or the other, but Irigaray’s claim that “these two subjects have the duty of preserving the human species” (p. 86) seems blatantly heteronormative and has an essentializing effect on both gendered subjects, even as it leaves the congenitally intersexed, the differently gendered, and the transsexual outside of bigendered subjectivity. Thus, even at its best, Irigaray’s conception of the two is inadequate to cover everyone.

Moreover, though she insists that a paradigm of two subjects rather than one universal subject can lead to greater intersubjectivity, presumably through the superior powers of empathy inherent in the female, thereby furthering her case for a gendered demarcation of dual
subjects, Irigaray’s (2004) stipulation that the two subjects “should not be situated in either a hierarchical or genealogical relationship” (p. 86) can be read to excuse hierarchical classifications along the lines of race, thus potentially furthering the othering of non-whites by both masculine and feminine classes of subjects. In fact, in terms of the subject’s relation to the Other, whether the Other is in the opposing subject position or in the position of any Other not defined by gender, there is little to suggest that Irigaray’s female generic of the Kantian subject amounts to much more than the Kantian subject in a dress. By essentializing the feminine, Irigaray creates a limited universal that is potentially as exclusionary as the single Kantian subject.

Finally, a second subject position necessitates a second set of universal features that define the subject as such. Irigaray (2004) declares that “it is essential to ensure that this barely defined feminine subject, lacking contours, forms nor mediations, have some points of reference, some guarantees, in order to nourish her and protect her own becoming” (p. 87). In seeking to define the terms and limits of the feminine subject, Irigaray actually begins to erase difference within the very set of former Others whom she has gathered into her circle of female subjectivity. Originally broad and diverse, Irigaray’s second subject must become Woman according to a set of characteristics that it is “necessary to give woman” and which Irigaray (2004) considers “appropriate to them” (emphasis added) (p. 87). But if the feminine subject does not come ready-made, if she does not exist outside an artificially constructed circle of feminine subjectivity, what is the point of inventing Woman purely for the sake of having a subjectivity into which to hale a set of Others nominally defined as female? Irigaray (2004) outlines a set of feminine characteristics involving “relationships with language, with the body (age, health, beauty, and, obviously, maternity),
and relationships with work, nature and culture” (p. 87). But these relationships are by no means the same for all women, and for many women, they may be no different than for men. Are these women, then, not women? If they do not assume these prescribed relationships, they are then relegated to the place of Other, shut out of the second subject position that was ostensibly conceived to de-Other them . . .

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. . . In her critique of Immanuel Kant (1785), Agacinski (2004) posits a different reason for rejecting the Kantian universal, insisting that the universality of Kant’s Categorical Imperative makes the formula untenably egoistic and imposes on the subject an abstract sense of duty toward the other at the expense of difference as it regards all others as self-same. Agacinski (2004) argues that Kantian ethics “excludes the relation to the other and the other’s voice” (p. 41), reducing all ethical questions to the subject and his or her general, predetermined duty in a given situation rather than attending to the needs of the other, rendering the other a mere object for the use of the subject. Unlike Irigaray (2004), Agacinski does recognize the possibility of women’s occupying the Kantian universal subject position. Agacinski’s complaint is not about who populates that subject position, but about the manner in which the subject goes about interacting with the Other. No doubt, her criticism would be entirely valid if Kant had extended his Categorical Imperative beyond its first formulation, but Agacinski addresses only the Principle of Universality in her critique: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 1785, n.p.). She declines to discuss the Principle of Humanity (End in Itself): “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant, 1785, n.p.).
These two principles, along with the Principle of Rationality, amount to an attempt on Kant’s part to categorize the good into sweeping, fundamental maxims that would provide both the individual subject and the collective society with an ethical device that could be deployed in any conceivable circumstance. The proper use of this device, however, is contingent upon the subject’s ability to employ reason and, especially in the first formulation, on the subject’s position in society, which affects his perspective on what is desirable in the social order.

On its own, the first formulation certainly seems to result in the absolute egoism Agacinski (2004) says it does, in which “there is no need for me to listen to the other in order to discover how I should behave towards them, for my reason will tell me” (p. 41). By the standard of the first formulation, it would appear that the subject’s only criterion for ethical decisions should be a rational cost-benefit analysis of the effect his actions would have on the material conditions of his own existence if they were to be put into practice by others. The desires of others and impact of one’s actions on others do not come into question. Moreover, the first formulation relies entirely on the Kantian conception of reason for its ethical foundation and thus tends to toward the hypothetical and the general rather than the particular and the personal.

However, the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative is not supposed to stand alone. In his second formulation, Kant (1785) himself provides a buffer against the egoism that Agacinski (2004) decries. The second formulation does, contra Agacinski’s assertion, deny the subject the right to treat the other as a means to an end, maintaining that the other is to be viewed as an end in itself, thereby moving the subject toward the kind of particularity Agacinski argues for, if only for the sake of universality in praxis as well as theory.
Kant’s exhortation to treat others as ends unto themselves effectively forces the subject to recognize and respect the other’s needs and desires as equal to his own by causing the subject to question what it is the other desires and why.

Admittedly, a flaw in the second formulation is that the subject must first recognize the subjectivity of the other, thus potentially disregarding the subjectivity of women and minorities (or women’s recognition of the subjectivity of men, for that matter). Certainly, Kant (1785) himself did not understand women as being included in the subject position (Agacinski, 2004). However, the problems proposed by this shortcoming are no different, than the problems that arise out of feminist conceptions.

Just as no effective way has been proposed to enforce the wholesale acceptance of the subjectivity of all persons, the recognition of a separate subjectivity in persons of other classes of subjects is equally unenforceable. The recognition of Irigaray’s (2004) distinct feminine subject can no more be made compulsory than can the female as subject in Kant’s conception of universal subjectivity. With any foundational rubric for ethical behavior, there will always be those who are not in compliance. The failure of some to fulfill their ethical obligations must not be seen to suggest that we should have no foundational set of ethics.

Kant (1785) argued that practical (experiential) reason is inferior to pure (a priori) reason predicated on a deontological code or imperative because practical reason’s empirical nature makes it necessarily contingent, circumstantial, subjective. His Categorical Imperative was designed to provide an objective foundation of ethics to counter the moral relativism of Utilitarian Ethics. As such, reason is intended to be deployed as a tool by individuals to preempt conflict within the greater social sphere. The force of intellect is intended to be applied to the relations between individual subjects only in the interest of maintaining the
peace on a larger scale. The Categorical Imperative is publicly oriented and deliberately 
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Together they constitute a social intelligence which is the complement of 
individual intelligences. (p. 104)

The universalizing effect of the Categorical Imperative finds its purpose not in the ratification 
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Justice, by any definition, cannot be achieved without particularity. It is one thing to 
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justice, a guarantor of communal harmony (assuming everyone is in compliance) unmediated by the collective valuation of the individual:

... this conjunction of individuals ... has given rise to a collective intelligence, certain representations of which will be puzzling to the individual mind. If sociology is open to criticism, it would ... be that ... certain of its exponents tend to regard the individual as an abstraction, and the social body as the only reality. (p. 104-5)

Under such conditions, not only is the individual lost in the crowd, but subjectivity is also limited to those who are in possession of the collective intelligence. According to Bergson, when an individual decides to stray from his obligations to society, perhaps because there is more in it for him than he stands to gain from maintaining a stable connection to the community, the rule of law is in place in an attempt to codify habit and social need, anticipate resistance to individual social obligation, and countermand that resistance as it occurs.

Collective justice consists of whatever is perceived by those interpolated into that system to be in the best interest of the community. In this sense, justice is not justice at all, but merely law (Derrida, 2005). It stands to reason, then, that since crowds are less agile than individuals, the evolution of the notion of justice in a given society – indeed, the evolution of communal designations of subjectivity – is slow and laborious ... 

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... the very vagueness that serves to make Kant’s (1785) Categorical Imperative universal also gives it the ability to be specifically ethical if and only if it is not codified into law, a situation which precludes the Categorical Imperative’s being a wellspring of justice and relegates it to being a tool for the application of mere law. Nonetheless, particularity should not be read to
mean lawlessness. Social order is, of course, crucial to the wellbeing of all members of a given society, regardless of their status. Kant’s Categorical Imperative, deployed with the compassion that particularity affords, remains an invaluable tool for the achievement of social order.

References begin on following page

Sources alphabetized


