The Freudian Left

(Nicholas Power, to appear in The Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Sex: From Plato to Paglia, Ed. By Alan Soble, Greenwood Press, 2005)

In his preface to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s influential Anti-Oedipus, Michel Foucault (1926-1984) offers the following reflections:

During the years 1945-1965 (I am referring to Europe), there was a certain way of thinking correctly, a certain style of political discourse, a certain ethics of the intellectual. One had to be on familiar terms with Marx, not let one’s dreams stray too far from Freud. (xi)

For many on the left, disillusioned both by the sudden rise of fascism and totalitarian regimes in Europe and the Soviet Union, Marxism still represented the way forward, even if it needed to be supplemented with psychological categories so as to explain these developments. Wilhelm Reich (1897-1957), himself a pupil of Freud (1856-1939), could write as early as 1934, that "when I was studying Marx, it seemed to me that Marx does not answer the question of the origin of man's inner contradictions" (1972, p. 39, fn.40). And there we have the research agenda for what Paul Robinson (following Norman O. Brown) termed the Freudian left; namely, the attempts, by theoreticians Herbert Marcuse [1898-1979], Brown [1913-2002], and Reich himself, to both extend Freud’s psycho-social analyses—as found in his later works such as the Future of an Illusion (1927) and Civilization and its Discontents (1930)—and to explain how orthodox Marxism left the totalitarian personality anomalous. In contrast to the conservative neo-Freudian “revisionists” who came to dominate psychoanalysis in the Anglo-American world and for whom the goal of therapy was adjustment (to a social reality of whatever degree of irrationality), the Freudian left would press a cornerstone of Freudian psychoanalysis, viz., that the wages of civilization is neurosis, and offer up not only the most radical critique of western liberalism of the last century, but a bold and positive vision of human liberation. In doing so, the Freudian Left lay the groundwork for post-modernist theoreticians such as Foucault and Lacan, and served as a lighthouse for many of the key constituencies—students, homosexuals, greens, women—of the New Left.

If the historical catalyst for this Freud-Marx confluence is clear enough (see Jay), understanding the deeper, philosophical, rationale for this most unlikely of partnerships requires that we examine the humanism of Marx [1818-1883] as well as Freud’s own views of the origins of man’s inner contradictions. For prima facie, the two thinkers are absolute antipodes: Marx the dialectic, utopian socialist, Freud the dualistic, pessimistic elitist, whose massenpsychologie (as in, say, Totem and Taboo (1912-1913)) is full of disdain for the average man. Philip Rieff, himself one of the conservative interpreters of Freud, summarizes their division sharply: “For Marx, the past is pregnant with the future, with the proletariat as the midwife of change. For Freud, the future is pregnant with the past, a burden of which only the physician, and luck, can deliver us.” (1959, 215). That Freud remained a bourgeois liberal all his life, declaring communism's "psychological premises” to be "an untenable illusion" (1930/1961, 113) must be put alongside his later focus on the instincts and their “vicissitudes” within social settings. Despite this, many have questioned whether his medical agenda and biological understanding of instincts as universals is compatible with the historical materialist reading Reich claims for him. (For as we’ll see below, it was Reich—for whom “the Oedipal relationship is not a biological but a social phenomenon,”(1972, 82)—who first and foremost historicizes psychoanalysis, even asserting that “psychoanalysis fully confirms Marx’s dictum that social being determines consciousness” (1972, 39).) Richard Lichtman provides a sustained argument that Freud and Marx adhere to incompatible views of human nature, and Isaac Balbus similarly robs neo-Marxist liberationist movements, including feminist ones, of any clear picture of their oppressor. Abraham Drassinower disagrees, locating the “forgotten claims of Eros” as the libidinal ties that bind communities in Hegel’s own “dialectic of recognition” (53).

In any case, neither Marx nor Freud survives fully intact in Marcuse or the others, though all three were very self-conscious of remaining true to both. Reich provides the most explicit statement of the Freudian Left’s most obvious departure from orthodox Marxism:

An effective policy, whose ultimate goal is the achievement of socialism and the establishment of the rule of labor over capital, must not only be based on a recognition of those movements and changes which occur objectively and independently of our will as a result of the development of the productive forces. This policy must also, simultaneously, and on the same level, take account of what happens “in people’s heads,” i.e., in the psychical structures of the human beings who are subjected to these processes and who actually carry them out—people from different countries and cities, people of different occupations, ages and races. (1972, 284)

The relationship of Reich to Freud is equally troubled, and he would agree with Marcuse’s melioristic criticism:

In Freud's theory, freedom from repression is a matter of the unconscious, of the subhistorical and even subhuman past, of primal biological and mental processes; consequently, the idea of a non-repressive reality principle is a matter of retrogression. That such a principle could itself become a historical reality, a matter of developing consciousness, that the images of phantasy could refer to the unconquered future of mankind rather than to its (badly) conquered past--all this seemed to Freud at best a nice utopia. (1966, 147)

Brown locates a deeper affinity between Freud and the psychologists making up the Freudian Left: it is the role of the negative, of tension, of contradiction and resolution in mapping “man’s inner contradictions” that makes Freud so amenable to Critical Theory, the Frankfurt School, and 20th c. Marxists. As Brown writes:

The Freudian revolution is that radical revision of traditional theories of human nature and human society which becomes necessary if repression is recognized as a fact. In the new Freudian perspective, the essence of society is repression of the individual and the essence of the individual is repression of himself. (3)

In terms of the philosophy of sex, the relevant point of contact for Marx and Freud is alienation; both saw social forces as essentially stripping man of his power and conceived of the practical recovery of this power and freedom via “consciousness-raising” as the goal of their respective programs. Demystification of the historical forces responsible for material production (for Marx) and revealing the repressed contents of the unconscious (for Freud) were the ways to decrease the irrationality of existence and to liberate mankind. Alienated labor within capitalist political economy was for Marx the crucial nexus of this loss of power:

This crystallization of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now…The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force…appears to these individuals, since their cooperation is not voluntary but natural, not as their united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and end of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which, on the contrary, passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these. (22-23)

From this perspective, Freud’s notion of a dynamic super-ego is in fact a theory of ideology. The boy (and Freud superimposes this on the girl) identifies first with his father, and develops an object-cathexis for his mother, who becomes (as the boy receives less of her affection) a competitor. Eros is then sublimated (displaying its flexibility, which is the key insight of Freud taken up by Reich, Marcuse, and Brown) and the child intensifies his identification with the father figure, and hence to authority, and to society (internalized as ‘conscience’) as a whole. The basic point is that identity formation (the culmination of the Oedipal Complex) can be seen as the result of an individuality repressed by societal demands. (Hence Marcuse: "according to Freud, the history of man is the history of his repression" (1955, 11).)

It is the particular sexual form that this repression takes that recasts Freud's shadow over the left in the 1960s (and which will re-surface in themes of “bio-power” in Foucault, for instance). For whereas many of Freud's successors within the psychoanalytical movement—Adler, Horney, Fromm, for instance—were to downplay his theories of sexuality, and to dismiss his early claim that all neuroses sprang from (anxiety over) sexual needs, Reich, Brown, and Marcuse elevate the libido and the body to be both the focus of societal repression and hence of man's liberation. As we will see, the theories of repression developed by these three differ greatly. In addition, liberation would take on different connotations in the three thinkers--for Reich it is the libido in strictly mechanical and genital "orgiastic" terms, for Marcuse the role of sexual "phantasy" and polymorphous perversity takes center stage, while Brown came to think of sex in almost mystical and Blakean categories--yet the liberating potential of the erotic unites the three as Freudian revolutionaries. It also unites them in a project explicitly renunciated by Freud: the possibility of a non-repressive society.

For Reich, all neuroses and illness were the result of incomplete or failed orgiastic release, which he conceived of a biological force: his “Cosmic Orgone Energy.” The healthy resolution of the Oedipal conflict led normally to a heterosexual genitality, which Reich saw as distorted or repressed only by economic conditions and social forces, including the family. Reich stands apart from Freud (and Marcuse) in rejecting the conciliatory thesis that some repression and sublimation were required for civilization. His two main works in this context, The Mass Psychology of Fascism (1946) and Sexual Revolution (1945) were hugely influential in searching for the origins of fascism (Nazism in the first, Stalinism in the second) in the submissive character structure produced by bourgeois families, their authoritarian father roles and attendant sexual repression. Gad Harowitz emphasizes the originality and daring of Wilhelm Reich’s break from Freud, and especially his denial of the irrevocability and hence ahistoricity of societal repression (see Chapter 5). Reich instead claimed that sexual sublimation (and the death drive itself) was merely historically contingent on the form that society, and the family within it, took. (Horowitz does take Reich to task for upholding “the frustration of the non-incestuous genital sexuality of oedipal children” to be the only source of repression (129).) In general, however, Reich’s historicism is the sine qua non of the Freudian Left, since only then can we say (with Fromm) that "the real object of psychoanalysis" became "the psychic life of societised man" (1973, 155).

The body was also the nexus of repression for Brown, and his “eschatology of immanence” (to use Susan Sontag’s memorable phrase (262)) foreshadows the postmodernism of many from Dilleuze to Irigaray:

With the whole world still in the bourgeois stage of competitive development and war, the thing to remember about Marx is that he was able to look beyond this world to another possible world, of union, communion, communism…And after Freud, we have to add that there is also a sexual revolution; which is not to be found in the bourgeois cycle of repression and promiscuity, but in the transformation of the human body, and abolition of genital organization. (1968, 246)

Brown is at pains to point out that the most basic of Freud’s speculations demand not only a science of culture, but also a revolution:

In a neurosis, according to Freud, the ego accepts reality and its energy is directed against the id… In a psychosis, the ego is overwhelmed by the id, severs its connection with reality, and proceeds to create for itself a new outer and inner world. The healthy reaction, according to Freud, like a neurosis, does not ignore reality; like a psychosis it creates a new world, but, unlike psychosis, it creates a new world in the real world; that is, it changes reality. (1959, 154)

For Brown, who remains the most Freudian of our triumvirate, sublimation (the result of repression) is essentially desexualization wherein the ego, incapable of accepting its own negation in death, dilutes its life and connects its “higher sublimations” (socially accepted transferences of erosic energy such as work and industry) to lower regions of the body in what Brown terms a “dialectical affirmation-by-negation.” If the simplest example of such sublimation-as-desexualizing is infantile thumb sucking, the “most paradoxical” is anality, and Brown concludes his magnum opus, Life Against Death with a simply astonishing deconstruction of “the excremental vision” in western literature and philosophy. In a discussion ranging form Luther’s eschatology, to Berkeley’s tar-water and Kant’s “categories of repression” we find a conclusion of sorts: “It is by being the negation of excrement that money is excrement; and it is by being the negation of the body (the soul) that the body remains a body-ego” (1959, 161).

Marcuse came to Freud only after a thorough dose of Hegel, Dilthey, Marx and Heidegger, and to understand his revolutionary sexual politics, we’ll have to backtrack. In his role as the major theoretician and philosopher of the Institute for Social Research, Marcuse reviewed the first English translation of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. This work first reveals Marcuse’s idée fixe: labor as an ontological category. Marcuse is out to uncover Marx as a philosopher not an economist, and as a humanist-existentialist, and not a determinist: “the crude communism which he [Marx] opposed…exists on the same level as capitalism—but it is precisely that level which Marx wants to abolish.” (1932/1972, p. 9) It also reveals a contradiction, though some might call it a dialectical movement, which asserts work to be an ontological category, hence a universal necessity, and yet at the same time is considered, as “ananke” or scarcity and the struggle for existence, a historical contingency, to be overcome by a new kind of man. This tension turns on the related notions of alienation, objectification, and reification, and concerns the relationship between consciousness or culture and nature. We could first locate it here:

The objective world, as the necessary objectivity of man, through the appropriation and supersession of which his human essense is first ‘produced’ and ‘confirmed’, is part of man himself. It is real objectivity only for self-realizing man, it is the ‘self-objectification’ of man, of human objectification. But this same objective world, since it is real objectivity, can appear as a precondition of his being which does not belong to his being, is beyond his control, and is ‘overpowering’. (1932/1972, p. 18. Italics in the original)

From Hegel, Marcuse inherits the liberal notion that man’s freedom consists in recognizing that the source of culture, morality, and sexuality is human consciousness itself, and such self-realization, as in Freud, amounts to a cure, as it also results in new forms of culture, politics, etc. (The optimistic strand is subjected to an unfortunately well-known criticism—for being inherently un-Freudian and anti-Marxist—by Alisdair MacIntyre, which in turn is properly lambasted by W. Mark Cobb (165ff).) This ambivalence—man’s artistic and intellectual creations are both an appropriation of nature, and hence possibly signify a liberation to our true nature, and at the same time express a domination of nature, and in that case represent the means of continued repression of instinct, feeling, and true need—will be recast by Marcuse into a critique of contemporary “affluent society” and its military-industrial-technological basis. The critique is one that also argues for the “emergence of a new Reality Principle: under which a new sensibility and a desublimated scientific intelligence would combine in the creation of an aesthetic ethos” (1969, 24). It can be found in Marcuse’s later, utopian/dystopian writings; by 1969, in his An Essay on Liberation, he could urge the New Left to move “from Marx to Fourier…from realism to surrealism” (22).

The “aesthetic dimension” is intended to resolve this tension in Marcuse, if only in the most abstract of terms. (Charles Reitz’s influential Art, Alienation and the Humanities (2000) opened up this line of Marcusean scholarship.) To understand it, we have to recall Kant’s understanding of aesthetic judgment as contrasted with the intellect. “Sinnlichkeit” or “sensuousness” was seen as the realm of lawless freedom, and as the central mental faculty through which “nature becomes susceptible to freedom, necessity to autonomy” (1966, 174). Orpheus, the original representative of polymorphous perversity now can achieve “the erotic reconciliation (union) of man and nature in the aesthetic attitude, where order is beauty and work is play” (1966, 176). Reason and intellect (and the performance principle itself) are themselves increasingly described by Marcuse as repressive and ideological, as they are oftentimes in Brown. The re-eroticization of the natural world would make it an object of contemplation, and would transform work into “display—the free manifestation of potentialities” (1966, 190). (The continued emphasis on labor is important to keep in mind, and can answer the charge that aesthetic and imaginative liberation is too superficial, and merely represents a philosophical gloss on the ironic, the playful, and the nihilistic aspects of 20^th century modernism; even in 1970, the hippies and beatniks are disavowed as the revolutionary subject, and the working classes remain its locus. (See 1970, 69.)) Liberation (or at least non-repressive desublimation) would also result not in sexual libertinism, but the spread “from sexuality constrained under genital supremacy to eroticisation of the entire personality” (1966, 201). In any case, most of this optimism would famously go over into pessimism by the time of One Dimensional Man (“ODM”)and this bleak picture of the wealth, the advanced technology and managerial prowess of late capitalist America would be Marcuse’s greatest legacy as a public intellectual. (Angela Davis provides a useful review of Marcuse’s complex relations to activist groups of the 1960s and 1970s, as do many of the contributors in Breines (1970).)

ODM, arguably Marcuse’s least coherent yet most well known work, remains famous for its vision of a hyper-instrumentalized sexuality, where the sexual freedom apparent in contemporary youth culture masks an ever deeper, most invidious form of managerial control. For the homosexual strain of New Left activism Kevin Floyd finds “an argument for its status as a direct affront to the bourgeois democratic state and to a normalized, phobically heterosexist culture” (105) and at the same time he notes the “nostalgic puritanism” of the following, oft-quoted passage of ODM:

Compare lovemaking in a meadow and in an automobile, on a lover’s walk outside the town walls and on a Manhattan street. In the former cases, the environment partakes of and invites libidinal cathexis and tends to be eroticized. Libido transcends beyond the immediate erotogenic zones—a process of nonrepressive sublimation. In contrast, a mechanized environment seems to block such self-transcendence of the libido. Impelled in the struggle to extend the field of erotic gratification, libido becomes less “polymorphous,” less capable of eroticism beyond localized sexuality, and the latter is intensified. (73)

In criticism of The Freudian left, we should perhaps begin with Emile Durkheim’s famous dictum: “Whenever a social phenomenon is directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is false” (128). That is to say, the romantic and idealistic (Hegelian) dimensions of this liberatory program hardly survive intact the now widespread postmodernist sensibilities in this areas. The critique of late capitalism in terms of narcissism, an instinctual aggression, an authoritarian personality, or fascist character structure, is perhaps too dependent on the un-argued assumption of there being a pre-existent, un-repressed or “natural” self to pass unchallenged by subsequent, post-modern and semiotic, critics (see, e.g., Butler, 98ff, Zizek, 12ff). If, as Foucault argues, the self is a cultural construction, if sex is an “imaginary point” and if even the notion of “repression” must be counted among those “juridical practices” responsible for the production, organization and fabrication of self and sexuality (81ff), then Marcuse’s “great refusal,” Brown’s resexualization, and Reich’s vegetotherapy, like Marx’s “species being” itself, resolve themselves into tactical or rhetorical maneuvers at best. (Whether modus ponens has a greater claim to this hypothetical than modus tollens cannot be dealt with here, however.) That the Freudian left (and Marcuse in particular) ignore the clinical observations of Freudian theory makes it “ahistorical to a degree which Freud’s [model] actually is not,” says Jeffrey Weeks (168). Douglas Kellner, whilst generally positive, voices a similar critique, calling Marcuse’s ODM a “historical synoptic” that “pictures the development of industrial society as a successful attempt on the part of corporate capitalism to dominate totally its helpless and passive victims” (273). Kellner quickly adds that Marcuse’s writings serve as a good “barometer” of social criticism, and that his later, post-1965, writings reflect the turn seen especially in France, with Foucault and Bourdieu towards more pluralistic and localized (i.e., post-structural) analyses of agency and resistance movements and away from an amorphous enemy of advanced capitalism. (Both Paul Breines (1994, 48ff) and W. Mark Cobb (181) argue that Marcuse foreshadows this very feature (among others) of Foucault’s thought.) Its biologism and essentialism, not to even mention the phallocentrism and heterosexism (of Reich alone), make the Freudian Left less attractive than these subsequent analyses to certain sensibilities, but I would argue that despite this, it pays us to attend to the more positive, universal, and hence modernist picture of man and man’s liberation that is the Freudian Left’s latest incarnation of the enlightenment tradition.

References

Balbus, Isaac D. Marxism and Domination: A Neo-Hegelian, Feminist, Psychoanalytic Theory of Sexual, Political, and Technological Liberation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.

Breines, Paul ., Ed. Critical Interruptions: New Left Perspectives on Herbert Marcuse. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970.

Breines Paul. “Revisiting Marcuse with Foucault: An Essay on Liberation meets The History of Sexuality.” In John Bokina and Timothy J. Lukes, eds., Marcuse: From the New Left to the Next Left. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994, 27-40.

Brown, Norman O. Life Against Death. Middletown CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1959.

Brown, Norman O. “A Reply to Marcuse.” In Negation: Essays in Critical Theory, translated by Jeremy Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968, 227-248.

Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.

Cobb, W. Mark. “Diatribes and Distortions: Marcuse’s Academic Reception.” In John Abromeit and W. Mark Cobb, eds. Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader. New York: Routledge, 2004, 163-187.

Davis, Angela “Marcuse’s Legacies.” In John Abromeit and W. Mark Cobb, eds. Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader. New York: Routledge, 2004, 43-50.

Drassinower, Abraham. Freud’s Theory of Culture: Eros, Loss and Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003

Durkheim, Emile. Les Regles de Methode sociologiqu. Paris: Alcan, 1901.

Floyd, Kevin. “Rethinking Reification: Marcuse, Psychoanalysis, and Gay Liberation,” Social Text 19:1 (2001), 103-128.

Foucault, Michel. A History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York, NY: Random House, 1978.

Foucault, Michel. “Preface” to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Steen, and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1973.

Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and its Discontents (1930). In vol. 21 of James Strachey et al., ed., Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth Press, 1953-1974, 57-145.

Fromm, Erich. The Crisis of Psychoanalysis: Essays on Freud, Marx, and Social Psychology. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973.

Horowitz, Gad. Repression: Basic and Surplus Repression in Psychoanalytic Theory: Freud, Reich, and Marcuse. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.

Jay, Martin The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973.

Kellner, Douglas. Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984.

Lichtman, Richard. The Production of Desire: The Integration of Psychoanalysis into Marxist Theory. New York: The Free Press, 1982.

MacIntyre, Alisdair. Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and a Polemic. New York: The Viking Press, 1970.

Marcuse, Herbert. (1932) “The Foundations of Historical Materialism” In Studies in Critical Philosophy. Translated by Joris De Bres. London: NLB, 1972, 1-49.

Marcuse, Herbert. (1955) Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

Marcuse, Herbert. One Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.

Marcuse, Herbert. An Essay on Liberation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

Marcuse, Herbert. Five Lectures. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. (1846) The German Ideology: Parts I and II. Edited by R. Pascal. New York: International Publishers, 1939.

Reich, Wilhelm. Sex-pol; essays 1929-1934. Edited by Lee Boxandall. New York: Random House, 1972.

Reich, Wilhelm. (1946) The Mass Psychology of Fascism. Translated by Vincent Carfagno. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970.

Reich, Wilhelm. (1945) Sexual Revolution: Toward a Self-governing Character Structure. Translated by Theodore P Wolfe. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970.

Reitz, Charles. Art, Alienation, and the Humanities: A critical engagement with Herbert Marcuse. Albany, NY: SUNY University Press, 2000.

Rieff, Philip. Freud: The Mind of the Moralist. New York: The Viking Press, 1959.

Robinson, P. A. The Freudian Left. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.

Sontag, Susan. (1961) “Psychoanalysis and Norman O. Brown’s Life Against Death” In Against Interpretation and Other Essays. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1966, 256-262.

Weeks, Jeffrey. Sexuality and its Discontents. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.

Zizek, Slavoj. The Metasteses of Enjoyment: Six essays on women and causality. London: Verso, 1994.

Supplemental Bibliography

Chesser, Eustace. Reich and Sexual Freedom. London: Vision Press. 1972.

Feuer, Lewis S., eds. Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1959.

Frosh, Steven. The Politics of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to Freudian and Post-Freudian Theory, 2nd Ed. New York: NYU Press, 1999.

Gay, Peter. Freud: a life for our time. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988.

Laplanche, Jean. Life and Death in Psychoanalysis. Translated and with an Introduction by Jeffrey Mehlman, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976

Pippin, Robert, Andrew Feenberg, and Charles P Webel, eds. Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia. South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Harvey Publishers, Inc., 1988.

Slater, Phil. Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.